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Rewards in real life are rarely receivedwithout incurring costs and successful reward harvesting often involvesweighing andminimizing
different types of costs. In the natural environment, such costs often include the physical effort required to obtain rewards and potential
risks attached to them.Costsmayalso includepotential risks. In this study,we applied fMRI to explore theneural codingof physical effort
costs asopposed to costs associatedwith risky rewards.Usingan incentive-compatible valuationmechanism,we separatelymeasured the
subjective costs associated with effortful and risky options. As expected, subjective costs of options increasedwith both increasing effort
and increasing risk. Despite the similar nature of behavioral discounting of effort and risk, distinct regions of the brain coded these two
cost types separately, with anterior insula primarily processing risk costs and midcingulate and supplementary motor area (SMA)
processing effort costs. To investigate integration of the two cost types, we also presented participants with options that combined
effortful and risky elements.We found that the frontal pole integrates effort and risk costs through functional couplingwith the SMAand
insula. The degree to which the latter two regions influenced frontal pole activity correlated with participant-specific behavioral sensi-
tivity to effort and risk costs. These data support the notion that, although physical effort costs may appear to be behaviorally similar to
other types of costs, such as risk, they are treated separately at the neural level and are integrated only if there is a need to do so.
Introduction
Adaptive decisions benefit from accurately assessing and com-
puting any potential costs before pursuing a course of action.
Two types of costs that may reduce future reward value are the
physical effort required to obtain rewards, and the risk arising
from variability in reward magnitudes. Although physical effort
has been examined with respect to motivation and reward (Pes-
siglione et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2010; Cle´ry-Melin et al., 2011),
few investigations have looked into the similarities of effort cod-
ing with other types of cost coding. Of these few, one is a study
revealing differences in the processing of effort and delay costs
when the two of them are presented separately (Pre´vost et al.,
2010).
Previous studies show that animals are less likely to choose
more effortful options when the size of the reward is fixed (Col-
lier and Levitsky, 1968; Walton et al., 2009). Together with find-
ings of risk and delay discounting (Richards et al., 1997; St Onge
and Floresco, 2010), this suggests that effort impacts behavior
similarly to other costs. Nevertheless, it remains an open question
whether costs are coded in a common or distinct manner at the
neural level. Lesion studies suggest that distinct brain regions
code effort and delay costs (Rudebeck et al., 2006; Walton et al.,
2006; Floresco et al., 2008). However, neuroimaging studies in
humans report conflicting findings of combined and distinct
coding of effort with other economically relevant factors. Similar
brain regions integrate effort with rewardmagnitude (Croxson et
al., 2009) and probability (Treadway et al., 2012). In contrast,
effort and delay costs are coded in anatomically separate areas
(Pre´vost et al., 2010). One possible explanation for these conflict-
ing findings could be that the different modalities of cost and
reward are either presented in isolation on single trials (Pre´vost et
al., 2010) or in a compound fashionwithin a single trial (Croxson
et al., 2009; Treadway et al., 2012). Here, we investigate this pos-
sibility by using both isolated and compound trials. Reconcilia-
tion for the conflicting findings could be common coding in
compound trials but separate coding in isolated trials.
We hypothesized that effort costs would be reflected in the
sensorimotor integration areas of the cingulate cortex, supple-
mentary motor area, and the striatum (Pessiglione et al., 2007;
Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Pre´vost et al., 2010).
In contrast, costs associated with risky options would be reflected
in risk-responsive areas, such as the insula (Preuschoff et al.,
2008; Mohr et al., 2010; Burke and Tobler, 2011). In comparing
isolated and compound trials, we considered two possibilities. A
common cost-coding region would respond to costs in both iso-
lated and compound trials, regardless of cost modality. Alterna-
tively, distinct regions may code their specific cost type during
isolated trials and feed into some third region only during com-
pound trials, when there is need to combine cost types. Regions
that have been assigned such an integrative role include the an-
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terior cingulate (Croxson et al., 2009; Kennerley et al., 2009) and
frontal pole (Prabhakaran et al., 2000; Bunge et al., 2009; Wun-
derlich et al., 2011).
Materials andMethods
Participants and prescanning procedures. Twenty-three participants
(mean age, 23.5 years; SD, 4.7 years; 8 women; all right-handed) took
part in the experiment.Of the 23 participants scanned, 19 entered further
fMRI analysis. One participant was excluded due to normalization prob-
lems during preprocessing, one was excluded due to incidental findings,
and two participants were excluded for excessive headmovement during
the task. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
were screened to exclude those with a previous history of neurological or
psychiatric disease. All gave informed consent and the study was ap-
proved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Canton of Zurich.
AnMR-compatible isometric dynamometer (Zu¨hlke Engineering and
Sensory-Motor Systems Laboratory)was used to assess participant hand-
grip force and allow participants to exert effort. First, participants were
asked to grip the 600 N dynamometer with their left hand and perform
five maximal-strength compressions. During this phase, the raw force
readout from the dynamometer was displayed as a thermometer level on
the computer screen and participants were instructed to try to fill the
thermometer while the words “MAX GRIP” appeared on the screen for
2 s each time. The average of these five force readings was used to cali-
brate the display and set the 100% effort levels of every participant for the
main task. The variance of the five maximal-force readings was used to
calibrate thresholds around the effort levels presented later. These
thresholds served to minimize the risk that a certain effort level may not
be attained by the participant due to behavioral noise. After this calibra-
tion, participants were invited to read the task instructions.
Task instructions and participant payment. Participants were informed
that they were taking part in an experiment to investigate how people
value effortful and risky prospects. The instructions covered the mean-
ings of the different stimulus types, the incentive-compatible Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak (BDM)-like valuation stage and how payment was
calculated. Understanding of the various stages of the task was verified
during the instruction phase through a series of questions and training
trials.
At the start of each trial, the participant was endowed with 1 Swiss
franc, which he or she could spend on that trial. Participants would then
be presented with an option that had an expected value of 50 cents (one
hundredth of a franc is called 1 Rappen in German-speaking parts of
Switzerland. For the reader’s benefit, we refer to 1 Rappen as 1 cent).
However the level of effort required to gain the 50 cents, or the level of
risk associated with it, varied from trial to trial. During option presenta-
tion, the participants were instructed to think about how much the op-
tion is worth to them.
The participants could then choose the “pay-to-play” option by deter-
mining howmuch of their single trial’s endowment to spend (in steps of
1 cent each) and entering this as their bid. The task computer would then
randomly select a number between 0 and 100. If the participant’s bid was
higher than this random number, the participant would be able to play
the option (i.e., exert the level of effort indicated by the option to gain 50
cents, or play the lottery with the indicated risk). Because the higher the
participant bids, themore likely it is that they play the option, the optimal
strategy in this auction is to bid the true subjective value of the option.
Participants were instructed that in the event their bid was higher than
the computer’s, they would buy the option at the price of the computer’s
bid and gain the result of the option. Earnings were calculated for each
session of the experiment. After they came out of the scanner, partici-
pants rolled a die to determine which session was finally paid out.
Stimuli and effort/risk levels. Three basic stimulus types were used in
the experiment. These corresponded to isolated effortful, isolated risky,
and compound options (Fig. 1B). Options were represented by blue
rectangles. Effortful options were indicated by a green line across the
rectangle, with the height of the green line corresponding to the required
effort level (0, 25, 50, 75, or 100% of the participant’s maximal grip
force). Risky options consisted of binary lotteries with equiprobable out-
comes and were denoted by red lines across the rectangle, with the dis-
tance between the lines corresponding to the level of risk (0, 10, 25, 40, or
50 cents SD around the expected value of 50 cents). Compound options
had both green and red lines. Thirteen compound options were used
(Table 1). Presentations of the three option types (isolated effort, isolated
risk, and compound) were randomly intermixed during the experiment.
Task.Each trial startedwith a variable intertrial interval (ITI)with only
the fixation cross visible in the center of the screen (Fig. 1A). ITI duration
varied according to a truncated Poisson distribution with a range of 2–11
s. The ITI was followed by the presentation of an isolated or compound
option in the center of the screen for 3 s. The following screen consisted
of the valuation stage (2.5 s), during which a horizontal scale ranging
from 0 to 100 cents was presented below the fixation cross. Participants
moved a red cursor along the length of this scale using a 100 N dyna-
mometer in their right hand. Where the cursor was after 2.5 s was taken
to be the subjective valuation of the preceding option. To remove the
correlation between starting point and value, the cursor’s starting point
was randomly switched between 0 and 100 cents on the scale. The current
value according to the position of the cursor on the scale was presented in
real time in numbers between the scale and the fixation cross. During this
time, the task computer selected a random integer between 0 and 100.
Following the valuation phase, participants were presented with the
fixation cross for a randomly jittered period of time (1–2 s). The outcome
phase followed, lasting 2 s. If the participant’s bid was equal to or ex-
ceeded the randomly selected number, the option was realized (i.e., the
option was resolved). In the case of isolated effortful options, the partic-
ipant was required to reach the necessary grip force within 1 s and hold it
for the remainder of the outcome phase. Failure to do so resulted in a red
cross above the stimulus. Success was indicated by a green check mark
above the stimulus, and participants received the 50 cent reward, minus
the computer’s randomly generated bid. In the case of a failure, partici-
pants did not win the 50 cents and lost their bid. In the case of isolated
risky options, the stimulus was presented for 1 s and the randomly de-
termined outcome was then enclosed in a white box for the remainder of
the outcome phase. For compound options, the participant had to reach
the required effort within 1 s and hold the level for the remainder, during
which the randomly determined outcome of the risky outcome was en-
closed in a white box.
In cases where the participant’s bid did not equal or exceed the ran-
domly drawn number, a blue rectangle with a red cross through it was
displayed for 2 s (i.e., the option was unresolved). The participants kept
their bid in this case. This was the same for all trial types (isolated effort,
isolated risk, or compound). The outcome phase was then followed by
the ITI. To familiarize themselves with the task and BDM procedure
before scanning began, participants performed a short practice session
consisting of one presentation of each trial type. Over the course of the
experiment, each participant performed 60 isolated effort trials, 60 iso-
lated risk trials, and 156 compound trials.
Data acquisition. Images were acquired using a Philips Achieva 3 T
whole-body scanner with an eight-channel sensitivity-encoding head
coil (Philips Medical Systems) at the Laboratory for Social and Neural
Systems Research, University Hospital Zurich. The task was projected on
a display, which participants viewed through amirror fitted on top of the
head coil. We acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images
(EPIs) with blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (slices/vol-
ume, 37; repetition time, 2 s). We collected 380–450 volumes in each
session of the experiment, together with five “dummy” volumes at the
start and end of each scanning session. Participants each completed four
sessions of the experiment in the scanner, with short breaks between each
session. Scan onset times varied randomly relative to stimulus onset
times. A T1-weighted 3D turbo field echo structural image was also ac-
quired for each participant. Volumes were acquired at a15° tilt to the
anterior commissure–posterior commissure line, rostral more than cau-
dal. Imaging parameters were the following: echo time, 30 ms; field of
view, 220 mm. The in-plane resolution was 2.75 2.75 mm, with a slice
thickness of 3 mm and an interslice gap of 0.5 mm. High-resolution
T1-weighted structural scans were coregistered to their mean EPIs and
averaged together to permit anatomical localization of the functional
activations at the group level.
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Image analysis. We used a standard rapid-event-related fMRI ap-
proach in which evoked hemodynamic responses to each event type are
estimated separately by convolving a canonical hemodynamic response
function with the onsets for each event and regressing these against the
measured fMRI signal. Statistical parametric mapping (SPM5; Func-
tional Imaging Laboratory, University College London) served to spa-
tially realign functional data, normalize them to a standard EPI template,
and smooth them using an isometric Gaussian kernel with a full width at
half maximum of 12 mm.
Onsets of task events were modeled as separate  functions and con-
volved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. Each trial type
(i.e., each level of effort, risk, and combination of the two) was modeled
with a separate regressor at the time of the presentation of that option.
Separate regressors modeled the BDM valuation time, resolved isolated
effortful options (i.e., effort exertion), unresolved isolated effortful op-
tions, resolved isolated risky options (i.e., experienced risk), unresolved
isolated risky options, resolved compoundoptions, and unresolved com-
pound options. Trials where participants failed to reach the required
effort level were notmodeled separately, as these trials only differed in the
option resolution task epoch, which was modeled across all trial types in
the resolved effortful option and resolved compound option regressors.
Across the whole experiment, subjects failed to reach the required effort
level on 8.84% of effort and compound trials. In contrast, they always
gave an adequate response in the valuation phase of the task, which was
Figure 1. Experimental design. A, Task. Participants first viewed a fixation cross for a variable ITI of 4–11 s. At the end of the ITI, an option was presented for 3 s. After option presentation,
participants were required to value the option by moving a red cursor along a scale to enter a bid. The current bid (based on the position of the cursor) was presented in text above the scale.
Participants held the cursor at their desired bid. This valuation phase lasted 2.5 s and measured willingness to pay for every option type. After a random jitter of 1–2 s, the outcome phase was
displayed for 2 s. If the bidwas above a randomly drawnnumber, the optionwas resolved andexecuted for the participant to gainmonetary reward.B, Examples of stimuli corresponding to different
option types. Options were represented as a blue rectangle and could be divided into three basic subtypes. For effortful options, the required amount of physical effort was denoted by the height of
a green bar (5 levels). Risky trial types were denoted by two red bars, the distance between which denoted the SD (i.e., risk) of the binary lottery (5 levels). Compound options contained risky (red
bars) and effortful (green bars) elements, following the same convention as isolated effort and risk trials.
Table 1. Effort and risk levels used in compound options
Effort level (percentage of maximum grip) 0 0 25 20 25 50 50 50 75 80 75 100 100
Risk level (SD cents) 0 50 10 25 40 10 25 40 10 25 40 0 50
Objective cost level (effort plus risk) 0 4 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 4 8
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the main interest of the present study. Participant-specific movement
parameters (3 regressors for rotations and 3 for translation) were also
modeled as regressors of no interest.
To assess effort coding, we formed contrasts that used the individually
determined subjective costs of each of the isolated five effort levels. For
risk and compound trials we proceeded similarly, taking the subjective
costs of each of the five risk levels and the subjective costs across the 13
compound option types as contrast weights on the single subject level.
These contrasts were mean-corrected and captured the subjective sensi-
tivity to changes in costs for effort, risk, and compound conditions on an
individual basis. They were taken up to the second group level in simple
t tests to identify regions that code subjective sensitivity to changes in
costs in the whole group of participants. Anatomically defined small-
volume correction was used to control for multiple comparisons in pre-
defined regions of interest according to the boundaries defined in the
Automatic Anatomical Labeling atlas. For presentation purposes, imag-
ing results are shown at the threshold of p  0.005 uncorrected unless
where specifically mentioned in the figure legends.
Time course extraction for psychophysiological interaction analysis. We
extracted time courses across the whole experiment in the left and right
insula (regions coding risk costs in isolated risky trials), in the ventral
supplementary motor area (SMA) and posterior putamen (pPut) (re-
gions coding effort costs in isolated effortful trials), and in the frontal
pole (coding the value of compound options). To be sure the time
courses did not contain spurious artifacts, we used the time course resid-
uals after regressing out constant and linear terms, a whole-brain time
course, and movement parameters.
Results
Behavior
To assess the subjective cost of effort and risk for each participant,
we measured their willingness to pay for different levels of risk or
effort, keeping the expected value constant. More specifically, in
an incentive-compatible BDM-like auction mechanism, partici-
pants were required to bid for isolated effortful, isolated risky,
and compound effortful and risky options that led to a monetary
outcome. The BDMmechanism is designed such that the optimal
strategy for subjects is to reveal their true willingness to pay (a
proxy of subjective value) for options (Bohm et al., 1997). Cru-
cially, all options, regardless of whether they entailed risk, effort,
or both, had the same expected value of 50 cents. Effortful op-
tions consisted of having to squeeze with 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100% of
maximal grip force to obtain 50 cents. Risky options consisted of
the following lotteries: 50 cents (no risk); 60 or 40 cents; 75 or 25
cents; 90 or 10 cents; 100 or 0 cents (maximal risk). Compound
options consisted of 13 orthogonal combinations of the two (Ta-
ble 1). In the present study, effort-averse participants will always
bid below the objective value of the option (50 cents) and de-
crease their bids as effort increases. The same would hold true
with respect to risk for risk-averse participants.We calculated the
subjective costs associated with each option by subtracting each
participant’s average willingness-to-pay for the option from its
objective expected value.
Isolated trials containing only effortful or risky options
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to com-
pare the effect of effort-cost level on willingness to pay. As ex-
pected, the proposed effort-cost level had a significant effect on
willingness to pay (F(4,72) 6.52, p 0.001). There was a signif-
icant linear effect of effort cost on the subjective costs of the
options ( 1.79, t 3.44, p 0.002, 14 of 19 subjects showed
increasing costs with increasing levels of effort) (Fig. 2A). There
was also a significant effect of the level of effort on the postexperi-
ment stimulus pleasantness ratings of effort cues and the level of
effort required (F(4,64) 11.93, p 0.0001) (Fig. 2B) as well as a
significant linear effect of the effort cost on pleasantness ratings
(0.88, t 2.94, p 0.009). Thus, effort costs reduced both
willingness to pay and pleasantness ratings. There was no signif-
icant shift in bidding behavior across time for effort trials (p 
0.87, multiple regression with time and trial type as predictors).
Required effort had no significant effect on error rates (failure to
achieve the required effort), supporting the notion that there was
no intrinsic risk during effort trials (repeated-measures ANOVA,
F(3,54) 1.02, p 0.39).
In a similar fashion, risk costs affected willingness to pay
(repeated-measures ANOVA, F(4,72)  9.50, p  0.0001) (Fig.
2C), indicated by a significant linear effect of risk on the subjec-
tive costs of the options ( 3.06, t 3.06, p 0.007, 15 of 19
subjects showed increasing costs with increasing levels of risk).
Also, the postexperiment stimulus pleasantness ratings of cues
were affected by risk costs (F(4,64) 9.33, p 0.0001) (Fig. 2D)
showing a significant linear effect of risk on pleasantness ratings
(0.60, t 2.51, p 0.02). There was no significant shift in
bidding behavior across time for risk trials (p 0.58). Together,
both risk and effort costs decreased the value of options as mea-
sured by willingness to pay or pleasantness rating.
Compound trials containing both effortful and risky options
Compound options contained both effortful and risky elements
and evenly covered the effort-risk space of isolated options (Table
1). The example illustrated in Figure 1B would indicate to the
participant that 100% effort is required to see the outcome of the
binary lottery (either 60 or 40 cents). Therewas a significant effect
of objective cost (i.e., proposed level of effort plus proposed level
of risk) on participants’ willingness to pay for options (1-way
repeated-measures ANOVA, F(6,108) 19.49, p 0.0001), but no
effect of time (p 0.67). As expected, subjective costs increased
as the objective compound costs increased (linear regression, R2
 0.54, p  0.01). The surface plot in Figure 2E illustrates that
costs increased as a function of both risk and effort in compound
trials.
To further investigate how participants arrived at valuations
during compound option presentation, we also tested whether
thewillingness to pay for isolated effortful and isolated risky trials
could be used to predict the willingness to pay for compound
options. We hypothesized that the subjective costs that each par-
ticipant attached to the levels of effort and risk in isolated effortful
and risky trials could be added in a linear fashion to arrive at the
subjective cost for the various levels of compound options. To
test this hypothesis, we performed a multiple linear regression
that included individual effort costs and individual risk costs.
Both effort ( 0.48, t 3.91, p 0.001) and risk cost ( 0.75,
t 9.75, p 0.001) regressors were significant. Across subjects,
there was no significant difference between the relative contribu-
tions of effort and risk costs to compound option costs (p 
0.07). Indeed, participant’s willingness to pay in isolated effortful
and risky trials significantly predicted their willingness to pay in
compound trials (p  0.001, Fig. 2F). Thus, participants ap-
peared to process and integrate both types of costs in compound
trials in an additive fashion.
Neuroimaging results
Areas sensitive to changes in the subjective costs of isolated
effortful options
To assess brain regions sensitive to changes in the costs of isolated
effortful options, we looked for activity correlating with the
mean-corrected participant-specific behavioral costs associated
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with the five levels of effort at the time of
the option presentation in our a priori re-
gions of interest. In agreement with our
original hypothesis, activity in the ventral
supplementary motor area (vSMA) re-
flected the changes in the subjective costs
of effortful options (Fig. 3A; peak at9, 8,
52;Z 3.42; p 0.05 corrected for SMA).
Time course analysis revealed that the av-
erage BOLD response in the supplemen-
tary motor area region of interest
differentiated between high-effort and
low-effort options, with the maximal re-
sponse occurring8–10 s after the stim-
ulus onset (Fig. 3B).
In addition to the vSMA, increasing
cost of effort was also reflected in in-
creased activity in motor-related regions
of the striatum, such as the pPut (Fig. 3A;
peak at 33, 10, 2; Z  3.49; p  0.05
corrected for bilateral putamen). Time
course analysis revealed that the average
BOLD response in the right putamen
differentiated between objectively high-
effort and low-effort options in a similar
manner to the vSMA (Fig. 3C). Thus, ac-
tivity in both the vSMA and the pPut re-
flected the behavioral finding of higher
subjective costs attached to options re-
quiring increasing levels of effort. Com-
parisons between the subjective effort
costs from the BDMauction and objective
linear contrasts for effort showed no sig-
nificant differences in fit for both vSMA
(t  0.70, p  0.49) and pPut (t  1.33,
p 0.19) (anatomical ROIs). One poten-
tial explanation for this similarity is that
effort levels were determined subjectively
during the calibration phase to adjust for
across-participant differences in maxi-
mum strength.
In our last region of interest, the cingu-
late cortex, activity during option presen-
tation correlated with the subjective cost
of effortful options in two distinct clusters
(anterior cingulate cortex peak at6, 14,
28; Z  3.02; p  0.001 uncorrected;
midcingulate cortex peak at 9, 28, 46;
Z  3.23, p  0.001 uncorrected). How-
ever, neither of these clusters survived
small-volume correction for the cingulate
cortex.
Areas sensitive to changes in the
subjective costs of isolated risky options
Next, we used the mean-corrected participant-specific behav-
ioral costs to assess risk-related brain activation during risky op-
tion presentation. As hypothesized, activity in both right and left
insula reflected the sensitivity to increasing costs of risk in a
participant-specific manner (Fig. 4A; left insula peak at30, 17,
14; Z 3.48; p 0.05; right insula peak at 42, 20, 1; Z 3.35;
p 0.05; both left and right clusters small-volume corrected for
insula). To further illustrate the effects, we plotted each partici-
pant’s  estimate for an objective high-risk greater than low-risk
contrast against the differences in subjective cost across these two
options. As expected, this resulted in correlations for both right
and left insula (Fig. 4B). Thus, insula activity scales with the
subjective costs of risk as implemented in isolated options. Com-
parisons between the subjective risk costs from the BDM auction
and objective linear contrasts for risk showed that insula activity
(anatomical ROI) was significantly better explained by subjective
risk costs (t 2.57, p 0.01).
Figure2. Behavioral results.A, The subjective costs of options presented on isolated effort trials increased as a function of effort
( p 0.001), with participants judging the 100% effort option to be significantly more costly than all others ( p 0.01). B, A
similar result was found for postexperiment pleasantness ratings of the effortful stimuli. C, On average, participants were risk
averse, with the subjective cost of the risky options increasing as a function of the variance of the proposed lottery ( p 0.0001).
D, This result was also reflected in decreasing postexperiment pleasantness ratings of the risky stimuli as a function of risk. E,
Surface plot of the subjective costs of compound options. Compound options contained both effortful and risky elements, and the
subjective costs associatedwith each option increased as a function of the additive objective levels of risk and effort ( p 0.01). F,
Using participants’ subjective costs on isolated effort and isolated risk trials, we could significantly predict the subjective costs on
compound trials ( p 0.001). All error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Areas correlating with the subjective costs of isolated effortful
and risky options
To testwhether there is a commonbrain region that codes sensitivity
to changes in both effort costs and risk costs, we performed a con-
junction analysis using the subjective cost contrast images from ef-
fort trials and risk trials. In our a priori regions of interest, therewere
no clusters that survived at a more liberal threshold of p  0.005
uncorrected. Outside the regions of interest, no activations survived
multiple-comparison correction at the whole-brain level. Direct
comparisons between effort and risk coding within each ROI (in-
cluding all voxels contained within the anatomically defined
regions) showed significantly stronger coding of effort rather
than risk costs in SMA and putamen (p 0.03, t 1.98 and p
0.04, t  1.80 respectively) and significantly stronger coding of
risk rather than effort costs in the right, but not the left insula
(p  0.03, t  1.90 and p  0.21, t  0.83 respectively). These
results support the notion that the brain codes effort and risk
costs in a spatially separate manner when costs are presented in
an isolated manner. Next we assessed whether this notion would
also hold for compound trials, where participants are forced to
integrate effort and risk.
Activations relating to
compound options
We first asked whether the regions coding
changes in effort and risk costs in isolated
options would also code the changes in
costs of the compound effort and risk op-
tions. We looked for activity in the insula
and SMA correlating with the risk and ef-
fort levels separately during compound
option presentation. Activity in the right
insula correlated with risk during com-
pound option presentation (peak at 33,
20, 13; p  0.04 corrected for 15 mm
sphere around the peak coordinate in iso-
lated risk trials) and activity in the SMA
tracked the effort during compound stim-
ulus presentation (peak at9, 17, 40; p
0.006 corrected for 15 mm sphere around
the peak coordinate identified isolated ef-
fort trials).
Our behavioral analysis showed that
costs during compound options could be
best explained by a linear combination of
effort and risk costs (Fig. 2F). We there-
fore investigated the anterior cingulate and frontal pole, regions
that have previously been implicated in the integration of cogni-
tive costs or of effort with other economic factors. This revealed
distinct clusters of activity that correlated with the changes in the
subjective costs of compound options in the frontal pole (Fig. 5A,
peak at9, 62, 22; Z 3.58; p 0.05 corrected for frontopolar
region). Intriguingly, these regions did not correlate with subjec-
tive costs during isolated trials at the threshold used throughout
(isolated effort trials, p  0.62; isolated risk trials, p  0.84),
lending support to our alternative hypothesis that the brain codes
costs in a distinct fashion when costs are presented separately but
in a combined and integratedmannerwhen costs are presented in
compound.
Given the frontal pole coded costs preferentially in compound
trials, the question arises whether and how these regions interact
with the regions coding costs in isolated trials. Accordingly, we
performed a psychophysiological interaction-based analysis
(Park et al., 2011) to assess whether activity in the frontal pole
during compound trials could be explained by activity in the
regions coding risk (bilateral insula) and effort (pPut and vSMA)
Figure3. BOLD responses on isolated effort trials during option presentation.A, Neural activity in the pPut (peak at 33,10,2; Z 3.49; p 0.05 corrected for bilateral putamen) and vSMA
(peak at9, 8, 52; Z 3.42; p 0.05 corrected for SMA) reflected the effort costs on isolated effort trials. B, Time course of activity in the vSMA (time locked to the presentation of options) in
response to 100 and 75% effort trials (red line) and 0 and 25% effort trials (green line). C, A similar time course of the BOLD response to high-effort and low-effort trials (time-locked to the
presentation of options) was also present in the pPut.
Figure4. BOLD responses on isolated risk trials during option presentation.A, Activity in the left insula (peak at30, 17,14;
Z 3.48; p 0.05) and right insula (peak at 42, 20, 1; Z 3.35; p 0.05; both clusters small-volume corrected for insula)
reflected the subjective costs of risky options at the time of option presentation. B, The degree of activation to the objective
high-variance greater than low-variance lottery during option presentation increased as a function of individual risk aversion in
both left insula (empty markers, solid line) and right insula (black markers, dashed line).
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during isolated trials. We hypothesized
that the degree to which isolated risk and
effort areas correlated with areas integrat-
ing costs during compound trials would
be proportional to the participant-specific
influence that risk attitude and effort atti-
tude had on their combined valuations.
To test this hypothesis, we performed a
multiple regression on the behavioral data
toassess the relative impactof subjective risk
and effort costs (asmeasured in isolated tri-
als) on the subjective costs of the compound
options (see Compound trials containing
both effortful and risky options). We also
performed an equivalent analysis using the
time courses of the isolated effort and risk
regions to assess their relative influence on
the time course of the frontal pole. As hy-
pothesized, the relative impact of effort ver-
sus risk on compound option valuation
correlated with the relative degree to which
individual effort (vSMA) versus risk (insula) regions were coupled
with frontal pole activity (R2 0.55; p 0.01) (Fig. 5B).
Discussion
This study provides the first evidence that costs arising from physical
effortandcostsarisingfromriskareprimarilyprocessedindistinctbrain
regions. By placing physical effort costs and risk costs on the same scale
(willingness to pay)wewere able tomake a direct comparisonbetween
thetwoatbothbehavioralandneural levels.Ourbehavioralresultsshow
that,althoughparticipantsdiscountedhigh-effortandhigh-riskoptions
in a similarmanner, effort costs correlatedprimarilywith activity in the
pPut and vSMA,whereas risk costs correlated primarilywith activity in
the insula.Our experiment provided a novel twist to previouswork on
physical effort costs by including compound options that combined
both risky and effortful aspects. For these options, costs correlatedwith
activity inthefrontalpole.Theseresultssuggest thatthebrainonlycodes
costs inanintegratedmannerwhenit isnecessary todoso,providingan
explanation for the seemingly conflicting previous accounts of com-
bined (Treadway et al., 2012) versus distinct (Pre´vost et al., 2010) cost
coding in the brain.
In linewithprevious findings, ourbehavioral results indicate that
participants discounted future reward value to greater extents as the
effort (Pre´vost et al., 2010) required to attain the reward, or the
reward-variability risk (Christopoulos et al., 2009), increased.How-
ever, a major goal of this study was to investigate how participants
combined these two costs to arrive at subjective valuations for com-
poundoptions thatwereboth risky andeffortful.Our results suggest
that participants add the two different cost modalities in a linear
manner, decomposing decision-relevant factors in a similar fashion
to mean-variance models in economics (Markowitz, 1952). It
shouldbenoted,however, that inourexperimentwedidnotvary the
mean (objective) value of options, and participants did not make
choices. We believe that these differences in task design caused our
participants to focus primarily on costs as opposed to reward mag-
nitude or cost–benefit trade-offs investigated in previous experi-
ments (Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010). Although the
BDM auction mechanism used to assess the subjective values of
options is incentive-compatible and widely used in economics, the
possibility remains that BDM valuations may not perfectly re-
flect preferences in choice situations (Horowitz, 2006).
We found spatially separate coding of risk in insula and effort
in SMA and putamen. Although economic theory may predict
that costs arising from different factors should be commonly
represented to ensure efficient processing (Keeney and Raiffa,
1976; Wallenius et al., 2008), our results from isolated effortful
and purely risky trials agree with previouswork showingmultiple
subsystems coding different economic aspects of options in the
environment (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Pre´vost et al., 2010;
Burke and Tobler, 2011). Coding the costs arising from different
modalities in distinct regions may be computationally efficient
when it is necessary to track each type of cost separately. For
example, physical effort costs require energetic responses from
the decision maker that may directly impact physiological states.
A foraging animal choosing to exploit a current patch or to move
on to search for another patch may treat the physical effort costs
of traveling differently from the risk costs associatedwith variable
patch-reward density as the former may have a more direct im-
pact on the current energy budget.
BOLD responses in the pPut and vSMA correlated strongly with
the effort costs denoted in purely effortful stimuli. Previous studies
implicated the striatumincodinganticipated future efforts (Pessigli-
one et al., 2007; Croxson et al., 2009). A role of posterior striatum in
effort processing is borne out by the fact that corticostriatal connec-
tions fromposteriormedialmotor areas aremore likely to terminate
there than in other regions of the striatum (Inase et al., 1996; Le-
he´ricy et al., 2004). The separate coding of effort costs may also be
related to effector-specific coding of action values (Gershman et al.,
2009), as in our task effortful options denoted a potential require-
ment of a physical response by the participant whereas risky options
did not require any response.
The distinct coding of risk costs in the insula demonstrated
here agrees with several previous studies implicating the insula in
the coding of different types of economic risk (Paulus et al., 2003;
Preuschoff et al., 2008; Burke and Tobler, 2011). One potential
explanation for the separate coding of risk costs (when presented
in isolated trials) is that risk may need to be processed in a more
flexible manner in the brain. While effort could be expected to
discount future reward values in a consistent way (with costs
imposed by the physical limitations of the body), an individual’s
response to future reward uncertainty may change quickly de-
pending on the dynamics of the external or internal environment
(Symmonds et al., 2010). Risk attitude has been shown to change
within the time frame of a single experiment (Huber and Kunz,
2007) and there is also a variety of risk attitudes present in
Figure5. BOLD responses on compoundeffort and risk trials.A, Neural activity in the frontal pole (peak at9, 62, 22; Z3.58;
p 0.05 corrected for frontopolar region) correlated with the subjective costs of compound stimuli at the time of option presen-
tation. B, Psychophysiological interaction-based analysis revealed that the relative influence of vSMA (isolated effort region) and
insula (isolated risk region) on the frontal pole activity during compound trials could be explained by the relative behavioral
cost-sensitivity to effort and risk (R 2 0.55; p 0.01).
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the subject samples undergoing neuroimaging experiments
(Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009).
To reconcile the differences in the previous literature regarding
combined versus distinct coding of different costmodalities, we also
investigated the coding of costs in compound options that entailed
both effortful and risky elements. We found that when participants
were forced to integrate these two costs, activity in the frontal poles
correlatedwith the combined costs. The frontal pole has been impli-
cated in the integration of higher-level cognitive processes (Bunge et
al., 2009) and the extensive dendritic arborization of the neurons in
this region suggest they receive inputs fromawidevarietyofneurons
throughout theprefrontal cortex andother association areas (Jacobs
et al., 2001; Ramnani andOwen, 2004). Prabhakaran and colleagues
(2000) show that the frontal pole integrates different types of infor-
mation during a working memory task. More generally, it has been
suggested that the necessity to integrate or concurrently process the
outcomes of2 cognitive operations or alternative options is a pri-
mary driver of activity in this area (Ramnani andOwen, 2004; Boor-
man et al., 2009; Bunge et al., 2009). We extend these previous
findings by showing that the frontal pole integrates information
about costs when the need arises.
Interestingly, the frontal pole performed the integration by
communicating during compound trials with regions involved in
isolated cost coding in a subject-specific manner. In other words,
the degree to which the vSMA (effort coding) and insula (risk
coding) influenced frontal pole activity correlated significantly
with participants’ individual sensitivity to effort and risk costs.
Together, our results indicate that the frontal pole may integrate
different economic factors according to subjective relevance, but
only when integration is necessary. This contributes to our un-
derstanding of the role of the frontal pole in integrating distinct
types of information for goal-directed behavior.
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